BP Blg. 22 case; prescription; amendment of information.

SP103815.pdf (application/pdf Object)

Republic of the Philippines
Court of Appeals
Manila

ELEVENTH DIVISION

NATASHA FASHION
CLUB/SHOECAT, INC.,
Petitioners,

- versus -

METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT OF LAS PIÑAS
CITY, BRANCH 79 and
VERNALINDA JIMENEZ,
Respondents

CA-G.R. SP No. 103815
May 20, 2010

D E C I S I O N
ABDULWAHID, J.:


In this petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, Natasha Fashion Club/Shoecat, Inc.
seeks to annul and set aside the Order1 dated April 14, 2008
issued by Judge Marjorie T. Uyengco-Nolasco of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 79, Las Piñas City, in
Criminal Case Nos. 60330-60337.

The records of the case show that on September 7, 2007,
petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of Las Piñas, charging private respondent
Vernalinda Jimenez of several counts of Violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22). Finding probable cause, the OCP
recommended the filing of the corresponding charges.2 Thus,
on November 16, 2007, the City Prosecutor charged private
respondent in eight separate informations, and the accusatory
portions of the first information read, as follows:

x x x.

Upon arraignment on February 22, 2008, private
respondent pleaded not guilty to the charges.11 On the same
day, she filed a Motion to Dismiss,12 arguing that petitioner's
right to file the actions had already been extinguished by
prescription. She alleged that under Act No. 3326, violations of
special laws prescribe after four years when the imposable
penalty is imprisonment for more than one month, but less than
two years, like violation of B.P. 22. Considering that her
alleged violations of B.P. 22 happened between October 3, 2003
to November 3, 2003, the offenses had already prescribed when
the informations were filed on November 16, 2007.13

x x x.

On the other hand, the prosecutor handling the case filed
an Opposition/Comment to the Motion to Dismiss.16 In support
thereof, he asserted that the commission of the offenses should
be reckoned from the date the checks were dishonored and not
on the date of issuance. Thus, since the earliest date of maturity
of one of the checks is on December 3, 2003 and the
informations were filed on October 8, 2007, the actions were
filed within the prescriptive period.

On April 14, 2008, the MeTC issued the assailed Order,17
dismissing the cases on the ground of prescription. x x x.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition for
certiorari x x x.

Petitioner contends that the trial court erroneously
reckoned the computation of the prescriptive period on the
date of issuance of the checks and not on the date of dishonor.
It argues that the period should be reckoned from the date of
dishonor of the checks since this is the last element which will
consummate the offense.20 Since the earliest date of maturity of
one of the checks is on December 3, 2003, it follows that the
prescriptive period will expire on December 3, 2007, at the
earliest. Thus, the actions have not yet prescribed when the
informations were filed on November 16, 2007.21

Petitioner further contends that the proposed amendment
of the subject informations is allowable under Section 14, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to the ruling of the trial
court, its proposed amendment specifying the actual dates of
the dishonor of the checks is not a substantial amendment since
the information already contained a sufficient allegation on
when the subject checks were dishonored.22

Finally, petitioner argues that the reinstatement of the
cases would not result in double jeopardy since the trial court
dismissed the cases on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and
the cases were terminated at the initiative of the accused.23
The petition is meritorious.

Act No. 3326, the Act To Establish Periods of Prescription For
Violations Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and
to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin To Run, is the law which
provides for the prescriptive periods of offenses or violations of
special laws. Under this law, violation of special laws which is
punished with the penalty of imprisonment of more than one
month but less than two years, prescribes in four (4) years.24
B.P. 22 falls under this category.

The central issue in this case is whether the actions filed
by petitioner have already prescribed. Relevant to this matter
is Section 2 of Act No. 3326 which reads, as follows:25
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of
the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same may
not be known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy. (Italics ours)

In this case, respondent court dismissed the actions on the
ground of prescription. It ratiocinated that since the checks
were issued within the period from October 3, 2007 to
November 3, 2007, the four-year period within which to file the
corresponding actions had already lapsed when the
informations were filed on November 16, 2007.26
We rule otherwise.

In light of recent jurisprudence, it is no longer accurate to
say that only the institution of judicial proceedings will
interrupt the period of prescription. In its illuminating
discussion in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. vs. Department of
Justice,27 the High Court ruled that the filing of complaint with
the Prosecutor's Office suffices to toll the running of the
prescriptive period. It ratiocinated, as follows:28
x x x Act No. 3326 was approved on 4 December 1926 at a
time when the function of conducting the preliminary
investigation of criminal offenses was vested in the justices
of the peace. Thus, the prevailing rule at the time, as shown
in the cases of U.S. v. Lazada [9 Phil. 509 (1908)] and People v.
Joson, [46 Phil. 380 (1924)] is that the prescription of the
offense is tolled once a complaint is filed with the justice of
the peace for preliminary investigation inasmuch as the
filing of the complaint signifies the institution of the criminal
proceedings against the accused. These cases were followed
by our declaration in People v. Parao and Parao [52 Phil. 712
(1929)] that the first step taken in the investigation or
examination of offenses partakes the nature of a judicial
proceeding which suspends the prescription of the offense.
Subsequently, in People v. Olarte, [19 Phil. 494 (1967)] we
held that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court,
even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination
or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of
prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court
where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the
case on the merits. In addition, even if the court where the
complaint or information is filed may only proceed to
investigate the case, its actuations already represent the
initial step of the proceedings against the offender, and
hence, the prescriptive period should be interrupted.

xxx xxx xxx

The following disquisition in the Interport Resources
case [567 SCRA 354 (2008)] is instructive, thus:
While it may be observed that the term “judicial
proceedings” in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before
“investigation and punishment” in the old law, with
the subsequent change in set-up whereby the
investigation of the charge for purposes of
prosecution has become the exclusive function of the
executive branch, the term “proceedings” should now
be understood either executive or judicial in
character: executive when it involves the investigation
phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and
judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of
investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty
person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution
should be sufficient to toll prescription.

Prescinding from the foregoing, we conclude that
petitioner's filing of the complaint-affidavit on September 7,
2007 effectively interrupted the running of the prescriptive
period. Thus, the actions have not yet prescribed when the
informations were filed on November 16, 2007. Even if the
four-year prescriptive period is to be reckoned from the date of
the issuance of the checks and not on the date of dishonor,
which is the operative act that consummates the offense, the
actions still have not prescribed because of the interruption of
the running of the prescriptive period caused by the timely
filing of petitioner's complaint-affidavit.

As regards the second issue, we also found that the trial
court erred in denying petitioner's motion to amend the
informations on the ground that the proposed amendment is
substantial in nature. More fittingly, the motion should have
been denied on the ground that the informations are already
sufficient in themselves and necessitated no amendment.
A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the
statute; acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time
of the commission of the offense, and the place where the crime
was committed.29

In this case, the subject informations sufficiently alleged
the foregoing details. That the precise dates of the dishonor of
the checks were not stated is of no moment since there is an
allegation that the checks were presented for payment within
ninety (90) days from the date of their maturity and were
subsequently dishonored by drawee bank. This statement
satisfies the sufficiency requirement of the law. The more
important consideration is that the elements of the offense, i.e.
the issuance of the check, knowledge of the insufficiency of
funds and the dishonor of the checks, were sufficiently alleged

in the informations.
Finally, we hold that the reinstatement of the case will not
result to double jeopardy.

For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements in
the first criminal case must be present:30

(a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction;
(b) The court had jurisdiction;
(c) The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and
(d) He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without the express consent of
the accused.

In the instant case, double jeopardy does not lie since the
dismissal of the case is anchored on the supposed lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court due to prescription. Moreover, the
case was dismissed upon the initiative of the private
complainant, hence, double jeopardy did not attach.

In view of the foregoing discussion, we hold that the trial
court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Order dated April 14, 2008 of the MeTC, Branch 79, Las Piñas
City, in Criminal Case Nos. 60330-60337 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Criminal Case Nos. 60330-60337 are hereby

REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.