Motions; 3-day notice rule not hard and fast rule; substantial compliance; mere opportunity to be heard is required - G.R. No. 171750

G.R. No. 171750

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Three-day notice rule, not a hard and fast rule


Although this issue has been obviated by our disposition of the two main issues, the Court would like to point out that the three-day notice requirement is not a hard and fast rule and substantial compliance is allowed.

Pertinently, Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court reads:


Sec. 4. Hearing of motion. – Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.

Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to insure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice. [Emphasis supplied]


The law is clear that it intends for the other party to receive a copy of the written motion at least three days before the date set for its hearing. The purpose of the three (3)-day notice requirement, which was established not for the benefit of the movant but rather for the adverse party, is to avoid surprises upon the latter and to grant it sufficient time to study the motion and to enable it to meet the arguments interposed therein.[47] In Preysler, Jr. v. Manila Southcoast Development Corporation,[48] the Court restated the ruling that “the date of the hearing should be at least three days after receipt of the notice of hearing by the other parties.”

It is not, however, a hard and fast rule. Where a party has been given the opportunity to be heard, the time to study the motion and oppose it, there is compliance with the rule. This was the ruling in the case of Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority,[49] where it was written:

Purpose Behind the
Notice Requirement


This Court has indeed held time and time again that, under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, mandatory is the notice requirement in a motion, which is rendered defective by failure to comply with the requirement. As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading.


As an integral component of procedural due process, the three-day notice required by the Rules is not intended for the benefit of the movant. Rather, the requirement is for the purpose of avoiding surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution by the court. Principles of natural justice demand that the right of a party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard.


The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based. Considering the circumstances of the present case, we believe that the requirements of procedural due process were substantially complied with, and that the compliance justified a departure from a literal application of the rule on notice of hearing.[50] [Emphasis supplied]


In the case at bench, the RTC gave UPPC sufficient time to file its comment on the motion. On January 14, 2005, UPPC filed its Opposition to the motion, discussing the issues raised by Acropolis in its motion. Thus, UPPC’s right to due process was not violated because it was afforded the chance to argue its position.
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