Notarized document as evidence - G.R. No. 172196

G.R. No. 172196

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The necessity of a public document for contracts which transmit or extinguish real rights over immovable property, as mandated by Article 1358 of the Civil Code,[25] is only for convenience; it is not essential for validity or enforceability.[26] As notarized documents, Deeds of Absolute Sale carry
evidentiary weight conferred upon them with respect to their due execution[27] and enjoy the presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all controversy as to falsity.[28] The presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was regular.[29] A defective notarization will strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a private instrument.[30] Consequently, when there is a defect in the notarization of a document, the clear and convincing evidentiary standard normally attached to a duly-notarized document is dispensed with, and the measure to test the validity of such document is preponderance of evidence.[31]

In this case, it should be pointed out that contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, the Deed of Sale dated June 20, 1966 did not comply with the formalities required by law, specifically Act No. 496,[32] otherwise known as The Land Registration Act, which took effect on January 1, 1903, as Section 127 of the Act provides:

FORMS
Section 127. Deeds, conveyances, mortgages, leases, releases, and discharges affecting lands, whether registered under this Act or unregistered, shall be sufficient in law when made substantially in accordance with the following forms, and shall be as effective to convey, encumber, lease, release, discharge, or bind the lands as though made in accordance with the more prolix form heretofore in use: Provided, That every such instrument shall be signed by the person or persons executing the same, in the presence of two witnesses, who shall sign the instrument as witnesses to the execution thereof, and shall be acknowledged to be his or their free act and deed by the person or persons executing the same, before the judge of a court of record or clerk of a court of record, or a notary public, or a justice of the peace, who shall certify to such acknowledgment x x x.[33]


In the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966, the Notary Public signed his name as one of the two witnesses to the execution of the said deed; hence, there was actually only one witness thereto. Moreover, the residence certificate of petitioner was issued to petitioner and then it was given to the Notary Public the day after the execution of the deed of sale and notarization; hence, the number of petitioner’s residence certificate and the date of issuance (June 21, 1966) thereof was written on the Deed of Absolute Sale by the Notary Public on June 21, 1966, after the execution and notarization of the said deed on June 20, 1966.[34] Considering the defect in the notarization, the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966 cannot be considered a public document, but only a private document,[35] and the evidentiary standard of its validity shall be based on preponderance of evidence.

Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

In regard to the genuineness of petitioner’s signature appearing on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966,[36] the Court agrees with the trial court that her signature therein is very much different from her specimen signatures[37] and those appearing in the pleadings[38] of other cases filed against her, even considering the difference of 17 years when the specimen signatures were made. Hence, the Court rules that petitioner’s signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966 is a forgery.

The Court agrees with petitioner that her admission was taken out of context, considering that in her Answer[39] to the Complaint, she stated that the alleged Deed of Sale purportedly executed by her in favor of Basilio de Guzman is a forgery; that she never signed the said Deed of Sale; that she did not appear personally before the Notary Public; and that she did not secure the residence certificate mentioned in the said Deed of Sale. She also testified that she never sold her land to Basilio de Guzman;[40] that she never met the Notary Public, Attorney Abelardo Biala,[41] and that she did not meet Basilio de Guzman on June 20, 1966.[42] The trial court found petitioner and her testimony to be credible, and declared the Deed of Sale dated June 20, 1966 null and void ab initio. These circumstances negate the said admission.

The Court finds the Notary Public’s testimony self-serving and unreliable, because although he testified that petitioner was the one who submitted her residence certificate to him on June 21, 1966,[43] the next day after the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on June 20, 1966, Crescencia de Guzman, respondent’s mother, testified that she and her husband got the residence certificate from petitioner and gave it to the Notary Public on June 21, 1966.[44] Thus, it is doubtful whether the Notary Public really knew the identity of the vendor who signed the Deed of Absolute Sale[45] dated June 20, 1966.

The Court notes that the trial court found petitioner and her testimony to be credible. It is a well-settled doctrine that findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses deserve a high degree of respect.[46] Having observed the deportment of witnesses during the trial, the trial judge is in a better position to determine the issue of credibility.[47]

In fine, the preponderance of evidence is with petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision dated October 27, 2005 and its Resolution dated April 5, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 78217 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 40 in Civil Case No. D-9040 is hereby REINSTATED.

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