Counsel who appears for client is presumed authorized by latter - G.R. No. 182915

G.R. No. 182915

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The crucial question now is: Did Fairland and Debbie voluntarily appear before the Labor Arbiter as to submit themselves to its jurisdiction?

Fairland argued before the CA that it did not engage Atty. Geronimo as its counsel. However, the Court held in Santos v. National Labor Relations Commission,[91] viz:

In the instant petition for certiorari, petitioner Santos reiterates that he should not have been adjudged personally liable by public respondents, the latter not having validly acquired jurisdiction over his person whether by personal service of summons or by substituted service under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner’s contention is unacceptable. The fact that Atty. Romeo B. Perez has been able to timely ask for a deferment of the initial hearing on 14 November 1986, coupled with his subsequent active participation in the proceedings, should disprove the supposed want of service of legal processes. Although as a rule, modes of service of summons are strictly followed in order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant, such procedural modes, however, are liberally construed in quasi-judicial proceedings, substantial compliance with the same being considered adequate. Moreover, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired not only by service of summons but also by voluntary appearance in court and submission to its authority. ‘Appearance’ by a legal advocate is such ‘voluntary submission to a court’s jurisdiction’. It may be made not only by actual physical appearance but likewise by the submission of pleadings in compliance with the order of the court or tribunal.

To say that petitioner did not authorize Atty. Perez to represent him in the case is to unduly tax credulity. Like the Solicitor General, the Court likewise considers it unlikely that Atty. Perez would have been so irresponsible as to represent petitioner if he were not, in fact, authorized. Atty. Perez is an officer of the court, and he must be presumed to have acted with due propriety. The employment of a counsel or the authority to employ an attorney, it might be pointed out, need not be proved in writing; such fact could [be] inferred from circumstantial evidence. x x x[92] (Citations omitted.)


From the records, it appears that Atty. Geronimo first entered his appearance on behalf of Susan/Weesan in the hearing held on April 3, 2003.[93] Being then newly hired, he requested for an extension of time within which to file a position paper for said respondents. On the next scheduled hearing on April 28, 2003, Atty. Geronimo again asked for another extension to file a position paper for all the respondents considering that he likewise entered his appearance for Fairland.[94] Thereafter, said counsel filed pleadings such as Respondents’ Position Paper[95] and Respondents’ Consolidated Reply[96] on behalf of all the respondents namely, Susan/Weesan, Fairland and Debbie. The fact that Atty. Geronimo entered his appearance for Fairland and Debbie and that he actively defended them before the Labor Arbiter raised the presumption that he is authorized to appear for them. As held in Santos, it is unlikely that Atty. Geronimo would have been so irresponsible as to represent Fairland and Debbie if he were not in fact authorized. As an officer of the Court, Atty. Geronimo is presumed to have acted with due propriety. Moreover, “[i]t strains credulity that a counsel who has no personal interest in the case would fight for and defend a case with persistence and vigor if he has not been authorized or employed by the party concerned.”[97]

We do not agree with the reasons relied upon by the CA’s Special Ninth Division in its May 9, 2008 Resolution in CA-G.R. No. 93204 when it ruled that Fairland, through Atty. Geronimo, did not voluntarily submit itself to the Labor Arbiter’s jurisdiction.

In so ruling, the CA noted that Atty. Geronimo has no prior authorization from the board of directors of Fairland to handle the case. Also, the alleged verification signed by Debbie, who is not one of Fairland’s duly authorized directors or officers, is defective as no board resolution or secretary’s certificate authorizing her to sign the same was attached thereto. Because of these, the Special Ninth Division held that the Labor Arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion in not requiring Atty. Geronimo to show his proof of authority to represent Fairland considering that the latter is a corporation.

The presumption of authority of counsel to appear on behalf of a client is found both in the Rules of Court and in the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC.[98]

Sec. 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 21. Authority of attorney to appear – An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of either party and reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to disclose whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorney willfully appearing in court for a person without being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions.


On the other hand, Sec. 8, Rule III of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC,[99] which is the rules prevailing at that time, states in part:

SECTION 8. APPEARANCES. - An attorney appearing for a party is presumed to be properly authorized for that purpose. However, he shall be required to indicate in his pleadings his PTR and IBP numbers for the current year.


Between the two provisions providing for such authority of counsel to appear, the Labor Arbiter is primarily bound by the latter one, the NLRC Rules of Procedure being specifically applicable to labor cases. As Atty. Geronimo consistently indicated his PTR and IBP numbers in the pleadings he filed, there is no reason for the Labor Arbiter not to extend to Atty. Geronimo the presumption that he is authorized to represent Fairland.

Even if we are to apply Sec. 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, the Labor Arbiter cannot be expected to require Atty. Geronimo to prove his authority under said provision since there was no motion to that effect from either party showing reasonable grounds therefor. Moreover, the fact that Debbie signed the verification attached to the position paper filed by Atty. Geronimo, without a secretary’s certificate or board resolution attached thereto, is not sufficient reason for the Labor Arbiter to be on his guard and require Atty. Geronimo to prove his authority. Debbie, as General Manager of Fairland is one of the officials of the company who can sign the verification without need of a board resolution because as such, she is in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the

allegations in the petition.[100]

Although we note that Fairland filed a disbarment case against Atty. Geronimo due to the former’s claim of unauthorized appearance, we hold that same is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of authority. Such mere filing is not proof of Atty. Geronimo’s alleged unauthorized appearance. Suffice it to say that an attorney’s presumption of authority is a strong one.[101] “A mere denial by a party that he authorized an attorney to appear for him, in the absence of a compelling reason, is insufficient to overcome the presumption, especially when the denial comes after the rendition of an adverse judgment,”[102] such as in the present case.

Citing PNOC Dockyard and Engineering Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,[103] the CA likewise emphasized that in labor cases, both the party and his counsel must be duly served their separate copies of the order, decision or resolution unlike in ordinary proceedings where notice to counsel is deemed notice to the party. It then quoted Article 224 of the Labor Code as follows:

ARTICLE 224. Execution of decisions, orders or awards. – (a) the Secretary of Labor and Employment or any Regional Director, the Commission or any Labor Arbiter, or med-arbiter or voluntary arbitrator may, motu proprio or on motion of any interested party, issue a writ of execution on a judgment within five (5) years from the date it becomes final and executory, requiring a sheriff or a duly deputized officer to execute or enforce final decisions, orders or awards of the Secretary of Labor and Employment or [R]egional Director, the Commission, the Labor Arbiter or Med-Arbiter, or Voluntary Arbitrators. In any case, it shall be the duty of the responsible officer to separately furnish immediately the counsels of record and the parties with copies of said decision, orders or awards. Failure to comply with the duty prescribed herein shall subject such responsible officer to appropriate administrative sanctions x x x (Emphasis in the original).[104]

The CA then concluded that since Fairland and its counsel were not separately furnished with a copy of the August 26, 2005 NLRC Resolution denying the motions for reconsideration of its November 30, 2004 Decision, said Decision cannot be enforced against Fairland. The CA likewise concluded that because of this, said November 30, 2004 Decision which held Susan/Weesan and Fairland solidarily liable to the workers, has not attained finality.

We cannot agree. In Ginete v. Sunrise Manning Agency[105] we held that:

The case of PNOC Dockyard and Engineering Corporation vs. NLRC cited by petitioner enunciated that ‘in labor cases, both the party and its counsel must be duly served their separate copies of the order, decision or resolution; unlike in ordinary judicial proceedings where notice to counsel is deemed notice to the party.’ Reference was made therein to Article 224 of the Labor Code. But, as correctly pointed out by private respondent in its Comment to the petition, Article 224 of the Labor Code does not govern the procedure for filing a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals from the decision of the NLRC but rather, it refers to the execution of ‘final decisions, orders or awards’ and requires the sheriff or a duly deputized officer to furnish both the parties and their counsel with copies of the decision or award for that purpose. There is no reference, express or implied, to the period to appeal or to file a petition for certiorari as indeed the caption is ‘execution of decisions, orders or awards’. Taken in proper context, Article 224 contemplates the furnishing of copies of ‘final decisions, orders or awards’ and could not have been intended to refer to the period for computing the period for appeal to the Court of Appeals from a non-final judgment or order. The period or manner of ‘appeal’ from the NLRC to the Court of Appeals is governed by Rule 65 pursuant to the ruling of the Court in the case of St. Martin Funeral Homes vs. NLRC. Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended, states that the ‘petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, or resolution sought to be assailed’.

Corollarily, Section 4, Rule III of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC expressly mandates that ‘(F)or the purposes of computing the period of appeal, the same shall be counted from receipt of such decisions, awards or orders by the counsel of record.’ Although this rule explicitly contemplates an appeal before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, we do not see any cogent reason why the same rule should not apply to petitions for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals from decisions of the NLRC. This procedure is in line with the established rule that notice to counsel is notice to party and when a party is represented by counsel, notices should be made upon the counsel of record at his given address to which notices of all kinds emanating from the court should be sent. It is to be noted also that Section 7 of the NLRC Rules of Procedure provides that ‘(A)ttorneys and other representatives of parties shall have authority to bind their clients in all matters of procedure’’ a provision which is similar to Section 23, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. More importantly, Section 2, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure analogously provides that if any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)


To stress, Article 224 contemplates the furnishing of copies of final decisions, orders or awards both to the parties and their counsel in connection with the execution of such final decisions, orders or awards. However, for the purpose of computing the period for filing an appeal from the NLRC to the CA, same shall be counted from receipt of the decision, order or award by the counsel of record pursuant to the established rule that notice to counsel is notice to party. And since the period for filing of an appeal is reckoned from the counsel’s receipt of the decision, order or award, it necessarily follows that the reckoning period for their finality is likewise the counsel’s date of receipt thereof, if a party is represented by counsel. Hence, the date of receipt referred to in Sec. 14, Rule VII of the then in force New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC[106] which provides that decisions, resolutions or orders of the NLRC shall become executory after 10 calendar days from receipt of the same, refers to the date of receipt by counsel. Thus contrary to the CA’s conclusion, the said NLRC Decision became final, as to Fairland, 10 calendar days after Atty. Tecson’s receipt[107] thereof.[108] In sum, we hold that the Labor Arbiter had validly acquired jurisdiction over Fairland and its manager, Debbie, through the appearance of Atty. Geronimo as their counsel and likewise, through the latter’s filing of pleadings on their behalf.
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