Principle of hierarchy of courts applied; certiorari dismissed - G.R. No. 187107

G.R. No. 187107

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We explained the principle of hierarchy of courts in Mendoza v. Villas,[1] stating:

In Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA) v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, a petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 was dismissed for having been filed directly with the Court, violating the principle of hierarchy of courts, to wit:

Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, citing People v. Cuaresma, this Court made the following pronouncements:

This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (“inferior”) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court’s docket. (Emphasis supplied.)

Evidently, the instant petition should have been filed with the RTC. However, as an exception to this general rule, the principle of hierarchy of courts may be set aside for special and important reasons. Such reason exists in the instant case involving as it does the employment of the entire plantilla of NEA, more than 700 employees all told, who were effectively dismissed from employment in one swift stroke. This to the mind of the Court entails its attention.

Moreover, the Court has made a similar ruling in National Power Corporation Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPC-DAMA) v. National Power Corporation (NPC).[2] In that case, the NPC-DAMA also filed a petition for injunction directly with this Court assailing NPC Board Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and 2002-125, both dated November 18, 2002, directing the termination of all employees of the NPC on January 31, 2003. Despite such apparent disregard of the principle of hierarchy of courts, the petition was given due course. We perceive no compelling reason to treat the instant case differently.

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