What is final order vs. interlocutory order? Appeal time is 15 days. - G.R. No. 158239

G.R. No. 158239

"x x x.

The denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order granting the defending party’s motion to dismiss is not an interlocutory but a final order because it puts an end to the particular matter involved, or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, as to leave nothing for the trial court to do other than to execute the order.[1] Accordingly, the claiming party has a fresh period of 15 days from notice of the denial within which to appeal the denial.[2]

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Ruling

The petition for review has no merit.

I
Denial of the motion for reconsideration of the
order of dismissal was a final order and appealable


Priscilla submits that the order of June 21, 2000 was not the proper subject of an appeal considering that Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that no appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion for reconsideration.

Priscilla’s submission is erroneous and cannot be sustained.

First of all, the denial of Javellana’s motion for reconsideration left nothing more to be done by the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97. It was clearly a final order, not an interlocutory one. The Court has distinguished between final and interlocutory orders in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo,[22] thuswise:

The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is

interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.

And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether appeal is the correct remedy or not. A final order is appealable, to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that “appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable;”[23] but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil action for certiorari. The explanation for the differentiation of remedies given in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo is apt:

xxx The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment itself.

The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.

Indeed, the Court has held that an appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment is effectively an appeal from the final order or judgment itself; and has expressly clarified that the prohibition against appealing an order denying a motion for

reconsideration referred only to a denial of a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order.[24]

II
Appeal was made on time pursuant to Neypes v. CA

Priscilla insists that Javellana filed his notice of appeal out of time. She points out that he received a copy of the June 24, 1999 order on July 9, 1999, and filed his motion for reconsideration on July 21, 1999 (or after the lapse of 12 days); that the RTC denied his motion for reconsideration through the order of June 21, 2000, a copy of which he received on July 13, 2000; that he had only three days from July 13, 2000, or until July 16, 2000, within which to perfect an appeal; and that having filed his notice of appeal on July 19, 2000, his appeal should have been dismissed for being tardy by three days beyond the expiration of the reglementary period.

Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (n)


Under the rule, Javellana had only the balance of three days from July 13, 2000, or until July 16, 2000, within which to perfect an appeal due to the timely filing of his motion for reconsideration interrupting the running of the period of appeal. As such, his filing of the notice of appeal only on July 19, 2000 did not perfect his appeal on time, as Priscilla insists.
The seemingly correct insistence of Priscilla cannot be upheld, however, considering that the Court meanwhile adopted the fresh period rule in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[25] by which an aggrieved party desirous of appealing an adverse judgment or final order is allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC reckoned from receipt of the order denying a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration, to wit:

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.[26]


The fresh period rule may be applied to this case, for the Court has already retroactively extended the fresh period rule to “actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.”[27] According to De los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat:[28]

Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statues ― they may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.

The “fresh period rule” is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within which an appeal may be made in the event that the motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower court. Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the "fresh period rule" should be applied to pending actions, such as the present case.

Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the “fresh period rule” will amount to injustice, if not absurdity, since the subject notice of judgment and final order were issued two years later or in the year 2000, as compared to the notice of judgment and final order in Neypes which were issued in 1998. It will be incongruous and illogical that parties receiving notices of judgment and final orders issued in the year 1998 will enjoy the benefit of the “fresh period rule” while those later rulings of the lower courts such as in the instant case, will not.[29]

Consequently, we rule that Javellana’s notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to the fresh period rule.

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