"x x x.
In the case of Heirs of Marcelina Azardon-Crisologo v. Rañon[44] this Court citing Article 1123 of the Civil Code[45] held that civil interruption takes place with the service of judicial summons to the possessor and not by filing of a mere Notice of Adverse Claim. Thus:
Article 1123 of the Civil Code is categorical. Civil interruption is produced by judicial summons to the possessor. Moreover, even with the presence of judicial summons, Article 1124 sets limitations as to when such summons shall not be deemed to have been issued and shall not give rise to interruption, to wit: 1) if it should be void for lack of legal solemnities; 2) if the plaintiff should desist from the complaint or should allow the proceedings to lapse; or 3) if the possessor should be absolved from the complaint.
Both Article 1123 and Article 1124 of the Civil Code underscore the judicial character of civil interruption. For civil interruption to take place, the possessor must have received judicial summons. None appears in the case at bar. The Notice of Adverse Claim which was filed by petitioners in 1977 is nothing more than a notice of claim which did not effectively interrupt respondents’ possession. Such a notice could not have produced civil interruption. We agree in the conclusion of the RTC, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the execution of the Notice of Adverse Claim in 1977 did not toll or interrupt the running of the prescriptive period because there remains, as yet, a necessity for a judicial determination of its judicial validity. What existed was merely a notice. There was no compliance with Article 1123 of the Civil Code. What is striking is that no action was, in fact, filed by petitioners against respondents. As a consequence, no judicial summons was received by respondents. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals in its affirmance of the RTC’s ruling, the Notice of Adverse Claim cannot take the place of judicial summons which produces the civil interruption provided for under the law. In the instant case, petitioners were not able to interrupt respondents’ adverse possession since 1962. The period of acquisitive prescription from 1962 continued to run in respondents’ favor despite the Notice of Adverse Claim. (Emphasis supplied.)
x x x."