"x x x.
The Court agrees with the CA. The issue of ownership and liquidation of properties acquired during the cohabitation of Eiji and Evelyn has been submitted for the resolution of the Makati RTC, and is pending[41] appeal before the CA. The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference dictates that the assumption by the Makati RTC over the issue operates as an “insurmountable barrier” to the subsequent assumption by the Parañaque RTC.[42] By insisting on ruling on the same issue, the Parañaque RTC effectively interfered with the Makati RTC’s resolution of the issue and created the possibility of conflicting decisions. Cojuangco v. Villegas[43] states: “The various branches of the [regional trial courts] of a province or city, having as they have the same or equal authority and exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should not, cannot and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments. A contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion and seriously hamper the administration of justice.” The matter is further explained thus:
It has been held that "even in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, it is, also, axiomatic that the court first acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other courts."
In addition, it is a familiar principle that when a court of competent jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, its authority continues, subject only to the appellate authority, until the matter is finally and completely disposed of, and that no court of co-ordinate authority is at liberty to interfere with its action. This doctrine is applicable to civil cases, to criminal prosecutions, and to courts-martial. The principle is essential to the proper and orderly administration of the laws; and while its observance might be required on the grounds of judicial comity and courtesy, it does not rest upon such considerations exclusively, but is enforced to prevent unseemly, expensive, and dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of the process.[44]
Petitioner maintains that it was imperative for the Parañaque RTC to rule on the ownership issue because it was essential for the determination of the validity of the REM.[45]
The Court disagrees. A review of the complaint shows that Eiji did not claim ownership of the Parañaque townhouse unit or his right to consent to the REM as his bases for seeking its annulment. Instead, Eiji invoked his right to rely on Evelyn’s commitment not to dispose of or encumber the property (as confirmed in the October 2, 1996 Order of the Makati RTC), and the annotation of the said commitment on TCT No. 99791.
It was Evelyn and PAFIN that raised Eiji’s incapacity to own real property as their defense to the suit. They maintained that Eiji, as an alien incapacitated to own real estate in the Philippines, need not consent to the REM contract for its validity. But this argument is beside the point and is not a proper defense to the right asserted by Eiji. This defense does not negate Eiji’s right to rely on the October 2, 1996 Order of the Makati RTC and to hold third persons, who deal with the registered property, to the annotations entered on the title. Thus, the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint based on this defense.
Petitioner did not question the rest of the appellate court’s ruling, which held that Evelyn and PAFIN executed the REM in complete disregard and violation of the October 2, 1996 Order of the Makati RTC and the annotation on TCT No. 99791. It did not dispute the legal effect of the October 2, 1996 Order on Evelyn’s capacity to encumber the Parañaque townhouse unit nor the CA’s finding that petitioner is a mortgagee in bad faith.
The October 2, 1996 Order, embodying Evelyn’s commitment not to dispose of or encumber the property, is akin to an injunction order against the disposition or encumbrance of the property. Jurisprudence holds that all acts done in violation of a standing injunction order are voidable as to the party enjoined and third parties who are not in good faith.[46] The party, in whose favor the injunction is issued, has a cause of action to seek the annulment of the offending actions.[47] The following is instructive:
An injunction or restraining order must be obeyed while it remains in full force and effect until the injunction or restraining order has been set aside, vacated, or modified by the court which granted it, or until the order or decree awarding it has been reversed on appeal. The injuction must be obeyed irrespective of the ultimate validity of the order, and no matter how unreasonable and unjust the injunction may be in its terms.[48]
x x x."