Remedy when interlocutory order is denied; hierarchy of courts - G.R. No. 196063

G.R. No. 196063

"x x x.

An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and not appealable.12 An order denying a motion to dismiss does not finally dispose of the case, and in effect, allows the case to proceed until the final adjudication thereof by the court. As such, it is merely interlocutory in nature and thus, not appealable.13 Section 1(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:


SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. - An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.

No appeal may be taken from:

x x x

(c) An interlocutory order;

x x x

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.



Clearly, no appeal, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, may be taken from an interlocutory order. In case of denial of an interlocutory order, the immediate remedy available to the aggrieved party is to file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.



In this case, since the trial court’s order denying the motion to dismiss is not appealable, petitioners should have filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to assail such order, and not a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. For being a wrong remedy, the present petition deserves outright dismissal.



Even if the Court treats the present petition as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which is the proper remedy to challenge the order denying the motion to dismiss, the same must be dismissed for violation of the principle of hierarchy of courts. This well-settled principle dictates that petitioners should file the petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, and not directly with this Court.



Indeed, this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction.14 However, such concurrence in jurisdiction does not give petitioners unbridled freedom of choice of court forum.15 In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor,16 citing People v. Cuaresma,17 the Court held:



This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (“inferior”) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court’s docket. (Emphasis supplied.)



In short, to warrant a direct recourse to this Court, petitioners must show exceptional and compelling reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This petitioners failed to do.



Petitioners merely rehashed the arguments in their motion to dismiss, which consist mainly of unsubstantiated allegations. Petitioners invoke the cases of Lagcao v. Labra18 and Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. v. Municipality (now City) of Pasig, Metro Manila19 in challenging the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 7949 without, however, showing clearly the applicability and similarity of those cases to the present controversy. Neither did petitioners explain why Ordinance No. 7949 is repugnant to the Constitution. Nor did petitioners specifically and sufficiently set forth any extraordinary and important reason to justify direct recourse to this Court.20



Likewise, assuming the present petition is one for declaratory relief,21 as can be gleaned from the caption of the petition, this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction over such a petition. While this Court may treat a petition for declaratory relief as one for prohibition22 or mandamus, over which this Court exercises original jurisdiction,23 it must be stressed that this special treatment is undertaken only in cases with far reaching implications and transcendental issues that need to be resolved.24





In the present case, there is absolutely nothing which shows that it has far-reaching implications and involves transcendental questions deserving of this Court’s treatment of the petition as one for prohibition or mandamus.

x x x."