Litis pendencia and res judicata explained

sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/january2012/181962.html

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The following requisites must be present for the proper invocation of litis pendentia as a ground for dismissing an action:

Identity of parties or representation in both cases;
Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts and the same basis; and
Identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.9

Regarding the first requisite, there is no dispute that the two cases have substantially the same parties.

Anent the second requisite, the CA correctly noted that to determine whether there is identity of the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for grounded on the same facts and bases, the following tests may be utilized: (1) whether the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and the second causes of action; or (2) whether the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other.10

However, we do not agree with the CA’s conclusion that there is no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in the two cases following the application of these tests. Instead, we find that there is substantial identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for between the two cases.
The CA held that using the first test, the evidence in the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Sale would be the Deed of Sale itself; while in the case impugning the Writ of Possession, it would be the trial court’s Order applying Article 129 of the Family Code.

We disagree. The CA failed to consider that RTC Br. 70 issued an Order dated 2 October 2003, which granted authority to Ceferino to sign the Deed of Sale on Amparo’s behalf. This same Order also contained, in its dispositive portion, a directive that “(a)fter the sale of the subject property shall have been consummated, all the occupants thereof shall vacate and clear the same to enable the buyer to take complete possession and control of the property.” Thus, using the first test, the same evidence – the 2 October 2003 Order of RTC Br. 70 – would defeat both Amparo’s Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Sale and her Petition impugning the Writ of Possession. Notably, Amparo failed to timely question RTC Br. 70’s Order dated 2 October 2003.

The CA also held that, using the second test, the defenses raised in one case will not necessarily be used in the other. It reasoned that although the grant of the Petition impugning the Writ of Possession would result in the nullification of the Deed of Sale, the denial of the Petition would not bar a ruling on the Complaint for nullification of the Deed of Sale, which was based on Amparo’s lack of consent thereto.

Again, we do not agree. Amparo seeks to prevent the sale and thereby maintain ownership of the conjugal dwelling, both in her Petition to nullify the Writ of Possession and in her Complaint for declaration of nullity of the Deed of Sale. In both cases, she theorized that (1) since the 3 January 2001 Decision of RTC Br. 70 merely directed the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership in accordance with Article 129 of the Family Code, its subsequent Orders directing the sale of the conjugal dwelling improperly modified its own final Decision; and (2) because she was the spouse with whom a majority of the common children chose to remain, the conjugal dwelling should be adjudicated to her in accordance with the mandate of Article 129 (9) of the Family Code.
Accordingly, using the second test, the same defense (i.e., the 2 October 2003 Order of RTC Br. 70) will defeat both the Complaint to nullify the Deed of Sale and the Petition to impugn the Writ of Possession. In fact, the subsequent Writ of Possession issued by RTC Br. 70 was the logical consequence of, and merely gave effect to, the Deed of Sale which it had previously approved. Basically, the two cases belatedly impugn the 2 October 2003 Order of RTC Br. 70 implementing its 23 May 2003 Order, which had long become final, following the earlier failed attempts of Amparo to impugn the latter Order.

As to the last requisite, a final judgment on the merits by a court that has jurisdiction over the parties and over the subject matter in the Petition to nullify the Writ of Possession would have barred subsequent judgment on the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Sale based on the principle of res judicata.11

At the time Amparo filed her Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Sale with RTC Br. 67, her Petition impugning the Writ of Possession was already pending with the CA. Thus, from the point of view of RTC Br. 67, the CA’s final judgment on the merits of the case before it would have barred a subsequent judgment on the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Sale.
When the CA eventually upheld the propriety of the Writ of Possession, it necessarily upheld the validity of the Deed of Sale, which the Writ of Possession sought to implement. On the other hand, had the CA declared null and void the Writ of Possession based on the grounds cited by Amparo, the Complaint to annul the Deed of Sale would have been barred. This is because upholding her position would necessarily include a ruling that the RTC Br. 70 Order directing the sale itself of the conjugal dwelling was improper. Such impropriety would then extend to subsequent orders merely implementing the sale of the conjugal dwelling, including RTC Br. 70’s grant of authority to Ceferino to sign the Deed of Sale on behalf of Amparo.

In fine, the CA erred in reversing the dismissal by RTC Br. 67 of the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale on the ground of the pendency of the Petition impugning the Writ of Possession before another Division of the CA.

Having ruled that litis pendentia was properly invoked below, Amparo was necessarily also guilty of forum-shopping, as correctly ruled by RTC Br. 67. As we held in Buan v. Lopez,12 “forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.”

Nevertheless, we take time to stress a point to avoid doctrinal confusion on litis pendentia and res judicata in this case.

Despite our pronouncement on the propriety of the dismissal of the Complaint for nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale on the ground of litis pendencia by RTC Br. 67, and the finality of the dismissal of G.R. No. 171260, we clarify that res judicata cannot be said to apply herein, simply because we dismissed Amparo’s Petition in G.R. No. 171260. While the dismissal of G.R. No. 171260 is now final, having been rendered by this Court which had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties thereto, it was not a judgment “on the merits” of the case.

A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits “when it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections”;13 or when the judgment is rendered “after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point.”14 In American jurisdiction, it is recognized that “(i)nstances in which dismissals are not considered to be on the merits for purposes of the application of the doctrine of res judicata include … dismissal based on court’s procedural inability to consider a case.”15
A reading of our Decision in G.R. No. 171260 shows that the Petition was dismissed upon a procedural inability to consider the case, based on the principle of finality of judgments. The Court’s reason for denying Amparo’s G.R. No. 171260 Petition seeking to nullify the Writ of Possession was that the said writ was merely a subsequent Order implementing that which was issued on 26 May 2003 by RTC Br. 70 authorizing the sale of the family home. Meanwhile, the latter Order can no longer be modified, as it has long become final.

We also take time to stress that the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Sale cannot prosper, because, like the Petition to nullify the Writ of Possession, it effectively seeks the modification of an already final Order of RTC Br. 70. In view of this Court’s consistent ruling that Amparo cannot be allowed to impugn the already final Order of RTC Br. 70 directing the sale of the conjugal dwelling, we deny the prayer for preliminary injunction to hold in abeyance the implementation of the Notice to Vacate.

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